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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1875 Francis Vose, a bondholder whose successful litiga-
tion had prevented the dissipation of the real estate pledged to
his bonds, filed a petition for the expenses of his litigation, in-
cluding the fees of his attorneys.1 A century later courts are
still wrestling with the basic question presented by Vose's peti-
tion: when should attorneys' fees 2 be awarded in representative
litigation? This Note will review the criteria which the courts
have developed and will propose a refinement to overcome diffi-
culties encountered in the application of those criteria. "Rep-
resentative litigation" will include all legal services which, if
successful-whether by final judgment, administrative adjudica-
tion, settlement or otherwise-directly benefit an ascertainable
class of people,s as did the services employed by Francis Vose. 4
Although similar issues have confronted state courts,5 this Note
will be primarily concerned with the development of federal law
in the federal courts.
The basic American attitude toward attorneys' fees is
unique. The rule in England,6 and apparently throughout the
1. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 529 (1882).
2. Throughout this Note the term "attorneys' fees" includes items
which are analytically equivalent, such as fees of investigators and ex-
pert witnesses. See, e.g., id. at 530 (investigators); Monaghan v. Hill,
140 F.2d 31, 34-35 (9th Cir. 1944) (expert witnesses).
3. See text accompanying note 77 infra. Cf. Nussbaum, Attor-
ney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. RIv. 301, 304-05
(1973) (defining " public interest litigation") [hereinafter cited as Nuss-
baum]. Throughout this Note the word "class" refers to the beneficiar-
ies of any proceeding, unless the context indicates that it is used in
its technical "class action" sense. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23.
4. See text accompanying notes 16-21 infra.
5. See, e.g., Annots., 38 A.L.R.3d 1384 (1971); 9 A.L.R.2d 1132
(1950); Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 314 & n.48, 315 n.51.
6. The English court rules provide that "[o]n the taxation of a
solicitor's bill to his own client . . . all costs shall be allowed except
in so far as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreason-
ably incurred." RuNEs Or THE SuPrm Coumn, Order 62, Rule 29(1).
The general rule is that all such taxable costs "follow the event." Id.,
at Rule 3(2). See The Solicitors Act 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 27, § 69
(taxation of bills on application of party chargeable or solicitor). See
also Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development,
38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 202, 204-07 (1966); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YArx I.J.
849, 856-58 (1929).
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rest of the world,7 is that in any action the prevailing party
may ordinarily recover attorneys' fees from his unsuccessful ad-
versary. Although this rule was transplanted to colonial Amer-
ica,8 it was subsequently abandoned in favor of the practice that
each litigant must bear the burden of his own representation.0
In the federal courts this practice was tentatively recognized
in 1796, when the Supreme Court acknowledged that "even if
that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled
to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by
statute."'." From this modest beginning the practice evidently
increased in dignity with the passage of time, for by 1872 the
Court was confident that "the principle of disallowance rests
on a solid foundation, and . . . the opposite rule is forbidden
by the analogies of the law and sound public policy."'1 In 1960
Judge Friendly reviewed both the judicial history of this prin-
ciple and its underlying public policies and concluded:
[T]he American practice of generally not including counsel
fees in costs was a deliberate departure from the English prac-
tice, stemming initially from the colonies' distrust of lawyers
and continued because of a belief that the English system fa-
vored the wealthy and unduly penalized the losing party.12
The Supreme Court employed similar language in 1967 to reaf-
firm the validity of the American practice.18 Speaking for the
Court, Chief Justice Warren observed that "the poor might be
unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their oppo-
nents' counsel.' 14
7. See Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 311-12 & n.31; Ehrenzweig, Re-
imbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REv.
792 (1966).
8. See McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation
as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619, 620 (1931).
9. Id. See also Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 312-13.
10. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
11. Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872).
12. Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 672 (2d Cir.
1960). The American practice, however, has been vigorously attacked
upon the very same ground. One advocate of a return to the English
rule has observed "[ifn sorrow and in anger-and in hope" that the
American practice "is not founded on some age-old principle of the com-
mon law or a peculiar psychology of the American people; but ...
is the result of a more or less accidental statutory history." Ehrenzweig,
supra note 7, at 792, 798. See also Goodhart, supra note 6, at 874-76;
McCormick, supra note 8, at 638-43.
13. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714 (1967).
14. Id. at 718.
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11. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RULE OF REIMBURSEMENT
IN REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION
While the American practice of disallowing attorneys' fees
was increasing in dignity and judicial favor, it was also accumu-
lating qualifications and refinements. 15 In the context of rep-
resentative litigation, these qualifications and refinements origi-
nated with the Supreme Court's approval of the award of at-
torneys' fees to Francis Vose in Trustees v. Greenough."0 Vose
was a large holder of bonds of the Florida Railroad Company.
On behalf of himself and the other bondholders, he filed a bill
against the trustees for a "fund" of over ten million acres of
state-owned lands, pledged for the payment of interest on the
bonds and installments of a sinking fund for meeting the prin-
cipal. The bill alleged that the trustees had refused to meet
the obligations of interest and installments and had dissipated
the fund through fraudulent conveyances at nominal prices. Af-
ter the trustees had been replaced by the court and a large por-
tion of the fund had been preserved for the benefit of the bond-
holders, Vose petitioned for reimbursement from the fund for
his expenses in the successful litigation. The circuit court
granted the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed, likening
Vose to a trustee, who is entitled to reimbursement for the rea-
sonable expenses of preserving the trust.17 In support of that
analogy, the Court observed first that Vose had represented all
other bondholders in the action' 8 and, second, that he had
15. See generally Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1963). Judicial refine-
ment of the practice has been accompanied by congressional provision
for "fee shifting" in certain remedial statutes. See note 91 infra.
16. 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
17. Id. at 532-33. The Court said that "if the complainant is not
a trustee, he has at least acted the part of a trustee in relation to the
common interest." Id. at 532. However, in reversing the circuit court's
order to the extent it included reimbursement for Vose's personal serv-
ices and expenses, the Court distinguished him from a trustee and pre-
ferred to treat him as an ordinary creditor:
Where an allowance is made to trustees for their personal
services, it is made with a view to secure greater activity and
diligence in the performance of the trust, and to induce persons
of reliable character and business capacity to accept the office
of trustee. These considerations have no application to the case
of a creditor seeking his rights in a judicial proceeding. It
would present too great a temptation to parties to intermeddle
in the management of valuable property or funds in which they
have only the interest of creditors, and that perhaps only to a
small amount, if they could calculate upon the allowance of a
salary for their time and of having all their private expenses
paid.
Id. at 537-38.
18. "[Tlhe bill was filed not only in behalf of the complainant
19741
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
brought into court a fund from which all bondholders received
a benefit.19 The Court concluded:
[The other bondholders] ought to contribute their due
proportion of the expenses which [Vose] has fairly incurred.
To make them a charge upon the fund is the most equitable
way of securing such contribution. 20
Thus it might be said that Vose's reimbursement was not
so much an exception to the American practice of charging at-
torneys' fees to each litigant as it was an application of the
broader principle that attorneys' fees ought to be borne by the
persons directly benefiting from the litigation, whether or not
they are joined as parties.21 The circumstances in which such
reimbursement is appropriate have been delineated by the sub-
sequent judicial refinement of the three factors identified by the
G'reenough court: (1) a procedural context in which an action
is brought on behalf of others besides the litigant himself; (2)
a substantive context in which those others are benefited by
the action; and (3) a practical context in which reimbursement
can conveniently flow from the beneficiaries to the litigant.
A. THE PROCEDURAL CONTEXT: THE FORM OF THE LITIGATION
Although it antedated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Greenough was an example of a representative or class action
-a suit by a creditor on behalf of himself and other creditors
similarly situated.2 2 Reimbursement for attorneys' fees has sub-
sequently been allowed for other litigation initiated expressly
as class suits or other representative actions. These actions have
included taxpayers' suits, 28  utility rate refund suits, 2 4 suits
himself, but in behalf of the other bondholders having an equal interest
in the fund. . . ." Id. at 532.
19. [T~he bill sought to rescue that fund from waste and de-
struction arising from the neglect and misconduct of the trus-
tees, and to bring it into court for administration according to
the purposes of the trust: and where all this has been done
.. the other bondholders have come in and participated in
the benefits resulting from his proceedings....
20. Id.
21. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 784, 786 (1939).
22. Cf. FED. R. Crv. P. 23, 23.1. See also Hornstein, Legal Thera-
peutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HAnv. L. Ruv.
658 (1956); Hornstein, supra note 21, at 787-88.
23. E.g., Fox v. Lantrip, 169 Ky. 759, 766, 185 S.W. 136, 139 (1916).
See also Hornstein, supra note 21, at 789 & n.34. Federal taxpayers'
suits are not allowed. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
24. E.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 307 U.S. 648 (1939).
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against the United States on behalf of local governments25 or
Indian tribes, 26 suits on behalf of employees to recover back
wages, 27 civil antitrust suits,2 8 and shareholders' derivative
suits.
2 9
In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank"0 the Supreme Court
recognized the propriety in certain circumstances of allowing re-
imbursement for attorneys' fees beyond the formal limits of a
class suit or other representative action. In that case the bank
had set aside certain bonds as security for fifteen trusts under
its management. When the bank became insolvent, the peti-
tioner, a beneficiary of one of the trusts, established her claim
to a lien on the proceeds of the bonds.31 Although she had not
purported to represent a class, the petitioner subsequently
sought reimbursement for "reasonable counsel fees and litigation
expenses to be paid out of the proceeds of the bonds," on the
ground that "she had established as a matter of law the right
to recovery in relation to fourteen trusts in situations like her
own.13 2 The Court directed that her petition be entertained,
stating:
[W]hen such a fund is for all practical purposes created
for the benefit of others, the formalities of the litigation-the
absence of an avowed class suit or the creation of a fund, as
it were, through stare decisis rather than through a decree-
hardly touch the power of equity in doing justice as between
a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation.33
25. E.g., Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957).
26. E.g., Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 120
Ct. CL 609 (1951).
27. E.g., Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 792
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
28. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
29. E.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); see Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The
"Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REv. 658, 667-
70 (1956); Hornstein, supra note 21.
30. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
31. Ticonic Natl Bank v. Sprague, 303 U.S. 406 (1938).
32. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 163 (1939).
33. Id. at 167. However, in view of the interests of other creditors
in the insolvent bank's limited assets, the Court strictly confined its
opinion to the district court's power to entertain the petition, refusing
to express a view on the merits of the claim for fees. The Court warned
that "such allowances are appropriate only in exceptional cases and for
dominating reasons of justice." Id. Despite these words of caution re-
imbursement was ultimately awarded by the lower courts. Sprague v.
Ticonic Natl Bank, 110 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1940).
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Since this Supreme Court decision, lower courts have freely
awarded reimbursement of attorneys' fees, notwithstanding the
plaintiff's failure to bring a strictly representative action.84 The
ingredient common to these cases has been successful litigation,
conducted by the plaintiff, but accruing to the benefit of non-
participants who could have brought the action themselves.
B. THE SuBsTANTmIVE CONTEXT: THE NATURE OF THE BENEFIT
The type of nonparticipant benefit which will support an
award of attorneys' fees has been the subject of considerable
litigation. The earliest decisions required such benefit to be re-
flected in a specific fund. Subsequent decisions recognized mon-
etary benefit apart from a specific fund, while the current ap-
proach is to require only a "substantial" benefit, even if it is
not measured in monetary terms.
In the early case of Trustees v. Greenough attorneys' fees
were reimbursed from a fund brought into court for proper ad-
ministration.3 5 The practice was extended three years later to
a lien on property not specifically brought under the manage-
ment of the court.8 6 Both decisions involved the preservation
of a fund to which the nonparticipating beneficiaries had mone-
tary claims-a rather objective example of benefit. An award
of attorneys' fees from either fund was equivalent to a propor-
tionate contribution from the beneficiaries to the expenses of
realizing the benefit.37 The doctrine supporting reimbursement
in such cases has thus become known as the "equitable fund"3' 8
or "common fund"3 9 doctrine, and it has been applied to both
the creation 40 and the preservation4 1 of monetary funds.
34. E.g., Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1965) (action
by creditor); Doherty v. Bress, 262 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 934 (1959) (wrongful death action arising out of aircraft disas-
ter).
35. See note 19 supra.
36. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
37. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
38. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973); Note, Awarding Attorney
and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L.
RaV. 1222, 1233 (1973). The power to order reimbursement of attorneys'
fees has traditionally been viewed as a power of equity. See Guardian
Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 240-46 (8th Cir. 1928),
rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
39. Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 314.
40. E.g., Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (fund for satisfaction of
antitrust damage claims); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58
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Recent decisions have relaxed the requirement of a specific
connection between the "fund" and the beneficiaries, such as a
trust or a lien. Much of this development has occurred within
the context of shareholders' derivative suits in the Second Cir-
cuit. In two cases42 the "fund" consisted merely of a judgment
for the "short-swing" profits recovered for the corporation
against officers and directors who had engaged in "insider" se-
curities transactions prohibited by section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.43 In a subsequent case4" there was
no identifiable fund at all; instead, the corporation had simply
been relieved of its obligation to issue a quantity of stock at
60 percent of its market value under a stock option plan. When
the plan was successfully challenged 45 under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act,46 no affirmative benefit was real-
ized, but some monetary loss was avoided.47 In all three of these
cases the complaining shareholders' attorneys' fees were assessed
generally against the corporation benefited by the suit, and not
specifically against a separate fund.
The same court which relaxed the requirement that the
monetary benefit to a corporation be reflected in a specific fund
had previously expressed dissatisfaction with the requirement
that the benefit even be measurable in monetary terms. In
Schechtma. v. Wolfson" the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit considered the reimbursement of attorneys' fees in a
derivative action aimed at interlocking directorates.4°  Despite
the absence of a benefit expressed in monetary terms, the court
rejected as "foolish" the suggestion that federal law would au-
thorize such suits but deny reimbursement for the attorneys'
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 648 (1939) (fund for refund of utility
overcharges).
41. E.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trus-
tees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
42. Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968); Gil-
son v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
44. Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
45. The challenge was successful in that the corporation's board
of directors mooted the action by cancelling the stock option plan when
it appeared to be doomed. See text accompanying notes 123-129 infra.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
47. The court recognized that the monetary detriment of the stock
option plan might have been partially offset by its incentive benefit.
However, in view of the illegality of the plan's ratification, the court
assumed that the offset would have been inadequate and that some
monetary detriment would have remained. 279 F. Supp. at 809-10.
48. 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
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fees without which the suits would virtually never be brought.50
Although such strong assertions would seemingly support the
award of attorneys' fees, they remained dicta. Reimbursement
was denied on the ground that the plaintiff had not dem-
onstrated that the benefit to the corporation had been "substan-
tial.""'
The Schechtman dictum was developed into a forthright
holding, not by the federal courts, but by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota in the leading case -2 of Bosch v. Meeker Coopera-
tive Light & Power Association.5 In that case a shareholder
had obtained a determination that a purported election of corpo-
rate directors had been illegal.54 His subsequent petition for
attorneys' fees was denied by the trial court on the ground that
his action had not resulted in pecuniary benefit to the corpora-
tion. The supreme court reversed, stating that a finding of sub-
stantial benefit to the corporation and its shareholders would
support the award of reasonable attorneys' fees, whether or not
the benefit was pecuniary.55 The court said:
Where an action by the stockholder results in a substantial
benefit to a corporation he should recover his costs and ex-
penses .... [A] substantial benefit must be something more
than technical in its consequence and be one that accomplishes
a result which corrects or prevents an abuse which would be
prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation or affect
the enjoyment or protection of an essential right to the stock-
holder's interest.5 6
This language was adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,5 7 a case hailed for its
impact on the traditional practices respecting attorneys' fees. 58
Shareholders of Electric Auto-Lite sought to set aside a merger,
50. 244 F.2d at 539-540.
51. Id. at 540.
52. The case was so characterized in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 395 (1970).
53. 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
54. Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 253 Minn. 77, 91
N.W.2d 148 (1958).
55. Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362,
367, 101 N.W.2d 423, 427 (1960).
56. Id. at 366-67, 101 N.W.2d at 426-27.
57. 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
58. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 320-21; Cole, Counsel Fees
in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions-Hornstein Revisited, 6
U. RiCHMOND L. REv. 259, 262-63 (1972); Note, The Allocation of Attor-
ney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 316,
317 (1971); Note, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company: Proxy Viola-
tions-The Causation Question and the Award of Attorney's Fees, 65
Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 873-76 (1970).
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alleging that its ratification had been obtained in violation of
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193451 and the
proxy rules thereunder.60 The district court entered an inter-
locutory summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of
liability,"' and the court of appeals reversed8 2  Upholding the
district court, the Supreme Court held that the proxy violations
established a cause of action 3 and remanded the case for further
proceedings on the issue of relief."4 Since the issue of liability
had been resolved in favor of the petitioning shareholders, the
Court held that they were entitled to interim reimbursement
for their attorneys' fees.05
Mils represented the confluence of two streams of judicial
thought. One stream involved the evolution of the old "equi-
table fund" into the concept of substantial benefit articulated
in Bosch. Although unable to express the proxy violations in
strictly monetary terms,66 the Mills Court permitted reimburse-
ment of fees, by restating the equitable fund doctrine in terms
of substantial benefit:
Other cases have departed further from the traditional
metes and bounds of the doctrine, to permit reimbursement in
cases where the litigation has conferred a substantial benefit
on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible
an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately
among them. 67
The other stream contributing to the Mills decision ema-
nated from a line of cases encouraging litigation by "private at-
torneys-general." The expression was used as early as 1943 to
describe persons explicitly given standing by Congress "to insti-
tute a proceeding ... to vindicate the public interest."0 38  The
concept was implicit in a variety of subsequent cases recogniz-
ing private causes of action under federal statutes, including the
securities legislation which has been a frequent subject of class
59. 15U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
60. SEC Reg. 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1973) (false or mislead-
ing statements).
61. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. 33.
1967).
62. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968).
63. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1970).
64. Id. at 386-389, 397.
65. Id. at 389-97.
66. See id. at 396.
67. Id. at 393-94. Cf. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532
(1882), quoted in notes 18-19 and text accompanying note 20 supra.
68. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated
as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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and derivative suits.69 In 1968 the expression was invoked to
support reimbursement of attorneys' fees in civil rights litiga-
tion.7 0 Two years later, the Mills Court reflected the influence
of the private attorney-general concept:
[Tihe stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair
and informed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that,
in vindicating the statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a
substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders ....
[P]rivate stockholders' actions of this sort "involve corporate
therapeutics," and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by pro-
viding an important means of enforcement of the proxy stat-
ute.71
Mills has been cited to support reimbursement of attorneys'
fees in litigation vindicating a number of statutory and consti-
tutional policies. In addition to corporate suffrage, 72 these poli-
cies have included union democracy,73 fair legislative apportion-
69. E.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Schecht-
man v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1957), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 48-51 supra. See generally Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
70. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 &
n.3 (1968) (per curiam). Piggie Park was a class action under section
204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (a) (1970),
to enjoin racial discrimination at five drive-in restaurants and a sand-
wich shop. The Act provided that "the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). The Court rejected a
subjective standard of delay or bad faith and held that the congres-
sional intent "to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination
to seek judicial relief" dictated an award of fees to every successful
attorney, "unless special circumstances would render such an award un-
just." 390 U.S. at 402. In the wake of Piggie Park, recovery of attor-
neys' fees from the defendant has become the general rule in racial
discrimination litigation. See Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971);
Note, Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in School Desegregation Cases: De-
mise of the Bad-Faith Standard, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 371 (1972); Note,
Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Litigation Where the Action
is not Based on a Statute Providing for an Award of Attorney Fees,
41 U. CiN. L. REV. 405 (1972); cf. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972) (equitable fund created by
a racial discrimination suit). See also Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 318-
31 (discussing the principle described as the "Piggie Park-Mills doc-
trine").
71. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970) (foot-
notes omitted).
72. E.g., Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516
(7th Cir. 1973) (action by a minority shareholder to rescind a corporate
reorganization).
73. E.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (suit for reinstatement of
an expelled union member); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 466
F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973) (four suits
by a candidate for union office to compel compliance with the Labor
[Vol. 58:933
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ment 74 and environmental protection.75 In the recent environ-
mental case of La Raza Unida v. Volpe7 6 the court summarized
the dual common fund/private attorney-general rationale of
Mills:
Mills extended the scope of the common-fund justification
for the awarding of fees by holding that no pecuniary benefit
need be demonstrated....
... The rule briefly stated is that whenever there is noth-
ing in a statutory scheme which might be interpreted as pre-
cluding it, a private attorney-general should be awarded attor-
neys' fees when he has effectuated a strong Congressional pol-
icy which has benefited a large class of people, and where fur-
ther the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement
are such as to make the award essential.77
It is the requirement of a benefit to "a large class of people"
which distinguishes the Mills result from a wholesale adoption
of the English rule on attorneys' fees. 8 Several cases decided
before Mills illustrate the confusion which can develop when
this requirement is overlooked. In 1941, for example, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit approved the award of at-
torneys' fees in a trademark infringement suit, despite the fail-
ure of the litigation to directly benefit a class.79 This decision
precipitated a flurry of similar decisions, citing and being cited
by one another.80 Finally, in Fleischmann Distilling Corpora-
tion v. Maier Brewing Company,8' the Supreme Court held that
attorneys' fees could not be reimbursed in trademark cases, ob-
serving that "none of the considerations which supported the
[equitable fund doctrine] are present here."8' 2  The significance
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401ff
(1970)).
74. E.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (suit
by voters against state officials to impose a plan of legislative reappor-
tionment).
75. E.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(suit to enjoin the construction of a highway).
76. Id. This was a suit only for injunctive relief, which under the
pre-Mills common fund doctrine had been held inadequate to support
reimbursement of attorneys' fees. Decorative Stone Co. v. Building
Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1928).
77. 57 F.R.D. at 97-98.
78. See note 6 supra.
79. Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir.
1941).
80. The decisions are ably discussed in Maier Brewing Co. v.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 359 F.2d 156, 161-63 (9th Cir. 1966), aft'd,
386 U.S. 714 (1967).
81. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
82. Id. at 720, citing Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161
(1939), discussed in text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
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of that observation has escaped some observers, however, and
Fleischmann has been criticized as a "stunning step backward"88
to a position which required a "marked change"8 4 before attor-
neys' fees could be awarded one year later in civil rights litiga-
tion.15 Actually, since there was no class involved in Fleisch-
mann (only the owner of the trademark rights in question) the
Court's holding is thoroughly consistent with even the most re-
cent summary of the Mills rule,86 and it remains a reasonable
limitation on the reimbursement of attorneys' fees.87
C. THE PRACTICAL CONTEXT: THE EFFECT OF REIMBURSEMENT
The third factor in any decision to order reimbursement of
attorneys' fees is the practical question whether the cost can
be conveniently assessed to the beneficiaries. The objective of
the original equitable fund doctrine was to achieve a proportion-
ate allocation among the beneficiaries, 88 and the substantial ben-
efit refinement did not alter this objective.8 9 Consequently,
proper application of the doctrine should result in the distribu-
tion of the burden proportionately among the beneficiaries.
Since no court has attempted to tax nonparticipating bene-
ciaries directly,90 reimbursement is available only from the par-
ties to the litigation. When a fund is created or preserved, the
fund can be invaded to reimburse attorneys, and the pro rata
invasion of the interests of the beneficiaries produces exactly
the desired result. When a fund is not involved, however, it
has been necessary to find another source for reimbursement,
and the usual practice has been to shift that burden directly
to the defendant.9 ' This practice recognizes the defendant's rep-
83. Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 316, 320 (1971). That this note misses
the significance of the class requirement is seen in its conclusion that
"the logic of the [Mills] case provides no limitations . . . ." Id. at 336.
84. Id. at 322. See also Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 319.
85. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968)
(per curiam). See note 70 supra.
86. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
quoted in text accompanying note 77 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 214-16 infra.
88. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1882), quoted in text
accompanying note 20 supra.
89. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970),
quoted in text accompanying note 67 supra.
90. Cf. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 168 n.8 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
91. Independent of any substantial benefit and class considerations,
fee shifting to the defendant is specifically required by certain statutes,
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resentative character, which enables it to pass its liability for
the plaintiff's attorneys' fees to the actual beneficiaries of the
legal services. In a shareholders' derivative or representative
action, for example, payment of fees by the corporation is ab-
sorbed by shareholders' equity and thus in effect is a pro rata
payment by the shareholders themselves, the beneficiaries of the
action.92 Similarly, a union, sued by one of its members in a
representative capacity, can pass the burden for the plaintiff's
attorneys' fees to its members through the collection of dues,93
while a government agency can achieve a comparable result
through taxation.9 4
The environmental case of La Raza Unida v. Volpe9" offers
one of the few opinions which specifically recognizes the objec-
tive of distributing costs in representative litigation. Considering
the question of substantial benefit, the court found benefit con-
ferred on successively wider classes of citizens-from "5000 peo-
ple about to be uprooted from their homes" to "200,000 residents
of Hayward, Union City, and Fremont" to "all Californians" to
"almost all of society."96  The court observed that the award
of attorneys' fees against the highway department, public works
department and chief highway engineer of the state would be
absorbed by the taxpayers and thus would "serve the ... objec-
tive of. . . matching, to the extent that the Court's jurisdiction
over the matter makes possible, the costs and the benefits of
e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Communication Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970), and authorized by others, e.g., Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970), often conditioned on a finding
of bad faith, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (de-
fenses "without merit"); Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C.
§ 1822(b) (1970) (violations committed "knowingly"). Even in the ab-
sence of a statutory authorization, fee shifting had been recognized as
an appropriate equitable remedy for bad faith, delay or obstinance. See
Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945(1972). Fee shifting has been employed not only against obstinant de-
fendants, but also against vexatious plaintiffs. E.g., Gazan v. Vadsco
Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934).
92. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 CoLuVr. L. REv. 784, 791-94 (1939).
93. See Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299
F. Supp. -1012, 1020-22 (D.D.C. 1969). See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1(1973); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973).
94. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
See also Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
95. 57 F.RD. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
96. Id. at 100.
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litigation. '97 In other words, since all California taxpayers ben-
efited from the attorneys' efforts, all California taxpayers would
be required to contribute proportionately to their reimburse-
ment. The court employed an award of fees against the state
agencies to achieve this proportionate contribution.
A century of litigation has thus honed and refined the rule
of Trustees v. Greenough. The formalities of a strictly repre-
sentative action are no longer essential. Moreover, the benefit
required to support reimbursement need not be measurable in
monetary terms. Finally, because the refined application of the
rule does not always produce a convenient fund, the defendant
is called upon with increasing regularity to bear the burden of
the plaintiff's attorneys' fees directly, often as a representative
of the ultimate beneficiaries.
III. DIFFICULT APPLICATIONS OF THE MODERN RULE
A. CREDITING THE PROPER PARTY: THE "BUT FOR" TEST
It is not always easy to apply the general principles under-
lying the reimbursement of attorneys' fees for legal services
which produce a substantial benefit for a class. In the simple
case the attorneys for the plaintiffs pursue litigation to a suc-
cessful conclusion in court and recover their fees pro rata from
the beneficiaries through either a common fund or a representa-
tive defendant. In the more complicated case, it may not be
obvious that the benefit is produced by the efforts of such at-
torneys alone, and the court 9s must determine whether the attor-
neys have earned reimbursement by causing the benefit. In
making this determination, one court recently employed a "but
for" test: reimbursement was denied because it was not shown
that the benefit would have been lost "but for" the services of
the petitioning attorneys 9 Although not often recognized in
those express terms, this test has been implicitly used in a vari-
ety of contexts to compare the contribution of the petitioning
attorneys with the contributions from other sources. These
97. Id. at 101. The context suggests, however, that the court
would have reached the same result in the absence of this matching
feature. See text accompanying notes 214-16 infra.
98. The determination will be made either by the court in which
the action has been litigated or, for services in administrative or other
non-judicial proceedings, by the court which is asked to award fees.
See, e.g., Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in
text accompanying notes 196-206 infra.
99. Id. at 1268-69.
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sources have included the counsel representing other plaintiffs,
the government agency responsible for the subject matter, the
defendant itself and other intervening causes.
1. Action of Other Counsel
When several attorneys or groups of attorneys represent
plaintiffs in the same case, and it is appropriate to award at-
torneys' fees, the general solution is to apportion fees among
then L00  The decisions in complex cases have frequently de-
parted from this solution in form but not in principle.10' For
example, in the Plumbing Fixture Antitrust Cases,10 2 some 370
actions were consolidated pursuant to multidistrict litigation
procedures,0 3 and the plaintiffs from one of the actions were
appointed "Class Representatives.' ' 0 4 Subsequently a fund was
created for the satisfaction of various claims, and at least twelve
groups of plaintiffs' attorneys from the several consolidated ac-
tions petitioned that fees be awarded from the fund.' 5 The
petitions of all but the designated representative attorneys were
denied.106 The designated attorneys were awarded fees from the
fund in general,1'0 but not from the portion thereof assigned
to the claims of the plaintiffs represented by the other attor-
neys. 08 In other words, the vesting of certain attorneys with
100. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549, 553-54 &
n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
101. See note 110 and accompanying text infra.
102. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Stand-
ard Sanitary Corp., 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa.), modified sub nom. Ace
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971); Phila-
delphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 323
F. Supp. 364 (ED. Pa. 1970).
103. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d 161
(3d Cir. 1973).
104. IA. at 1080.
105. See id. at 1081.
106. Id. at 1092-96. One of the disappointed groups of attorneys
successfully appealed. See note 111 infra.
107. Id. at 1086-87. In reversing on this issue, the court of appeals
recognized the propriety of awarding fees to the petitioners from the
portion of the fund involved. Reversal was based on the district court's
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing before determining the amount
of the award, and the case was remanded for such a hearing. Lindy
Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp, 487
F.2d 161, 169-70 (3d Cir. 1973).
108. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077, 1085-86 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd oan other
grounds, 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). The designated representative at-
torneys were also compensated under their contracts with their individ-
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a recognized representative statusl10 limited reimbursement for
the other attorneys to the terms of their individual contracts
with their clients. Conversely, the reimbursement of the rep-
resentative attorneys beyond the terms of their individual con-
tracts was limited to that portion of the fund allocated to bene-
ficiaries which had not participated in the suit. Viewed in these
terms, it is apparent that each beneficiary bore a proportionate
burden of the fees of only one group of attorneys: the partici-
pating plaintiffs paid their own attorneys, while the nonpartici-
pating beneficiaries "paid" the additional compensation of the at-
torneys for the "Class Representatives."' 1 0 The symmetry of
this result appears consistent with the basic objectives of the
reimbursement rule, which seeks to match the benefit and the
expenses of the litigation."'
2. Action of a Government Agency
When reimbursement of attorneys' fees is sought for repre-
sentation before a government agency, or when the subject of
a court proceeding is within the cognizance of a government
agency, there is a possibility that the efforts of a private attor-
ney merely duplicate the activity of the agency and produce no
benefit that the agency alone could not have ensured. In such
a case, application of a "but for" standard might result in the
attorney's being "characterized as a mere volunteer who aids
a public body or trust in the performance of their official duties
on behalf of a certain class, but who is not entitled to compen-
sation." 11 2  This problem was illustrated in Edison Light &
ual clients, the "Class Representatives." They sought no reimbursement
from that portion of the fund allocated to their own clients.
109. "Representative status" has also been described as "lead coun-
sel status." 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PIIOCED-
urn§ 1803, at 292 (1972).
110. Considering whether the attorneys for the Class Representa-
tives had earned such additional compensation, the trial court observed
that "[tjhere is no doubt that [they] were principally responsible for
the settlement that was finally consummated." 341 F. Supp. at 1086.
Thus the principle of proportionate compensation was respected in this
exceptionally complex case.
111. See Part II supra. One of the eleven groups of attorneys de-
nied reimbursement appealed and established its right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1973); cf. note 107
supra. If fees are awarded to this group after a hearing, consistency
with the general objectives would be lost.
112. Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262, 1269 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.1 1 3 In
that case a merger of a railroad with its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, a public utility, had been opposed by a small group of
consumers. Ultimately the merger was prevented, the utility's
rate structure was found to be excessive, and a schedule of
greatly reduced rates was adopted." 4 The attorneys represent-
ing the consumer group sought reimbursement for their efforts,
claiming that they had bestowed a benefit on all consumers.
The court denied their petitions on the ground that throughout
the proceedings
. . . the entire body of consumers was represented by the
Public Utility Commission, its legal staff, and the Attorney
General of Pennsylvania. Or, if a technical representation-the
relation of attorney and client--did not exist, at least these offi-
cers assumed, in accordance with the law and the policy of the
state, the duty of protecting the consuming public's interests;
and there is no suggestion that there was any negligence, inef-
ficiency, or want of fidelity on their part which required their
efforts to be supplemented by the attorneys representing the
petitioners.115
The converse of this holding was suggested by Schechtman
v. Wolfson,1 6 in which a shareholder's prosecution of a deriva-
tive action had resulted in the resignation of the offending cor-
porate directors. Taking an approach similar to Edison, the dis-
trict court denied reimbursement because the plaintiff "could
have obtained for [the corporation] gratuitously from the [Fed-
eral Trade] Commission everything for which he now asks [the
corporation] to reimburse his attorneys.""17 The court of ap-
peals rejected this argument, observing that "[t] here is nothing
in the statute which restricts remedy against interlocking direc-
torates to action by the Commission."" 8 In response to the sug-
gestion that the shareholder should have invoked the aid of the
Federal Trade Commission, the court added that "[i] t seems well
known that the Commission has found little occasion, and per-
haps little incentive, to take action in the premises ... 1..
113. 34 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1940), affd per curiam, 119 F.2d 779
(3d Cir. 1941).
114. See Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1939).
115. Edison Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
34 F. Supp. 939, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 119 P.2d 779
(3d Cir. 1941).
116. 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
117. Schechtman v. Wolfson, 141 F. Supp. 453, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
118. Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1957).
119. Id. See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) ('Because of budgetary limitations and alternative demands on
available manpower, the [Securities and Exchange] Commission cannot
fully investigate or take action in every case of possible violation.").
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However, as the Schechtman court's innovative "substantial ben-
efit" test remained dicta, 120 so did its evaluation of the Com-
mission's effectiveness. Attorneys' fees were denied on other
grounds. 121
Thus attorneys have been denied reimbursement for merely
duplicating or paralleling the effective activity of a government
agency. Moreover, subject possibly to the Schechtman dicta, re-
imbursement may be denied even where the agency does not
act if the court finds that the agency's inaction is due to the
petitioner's failure to seek an administrative remedy.
3. Action of the Defendant
The action of the defendant can also detract from the claims
of the plaintiffs' attorneys that they have caused a beneficial
result. First, the defendant may render the plaintiffs' cause of
action moot by unilaterally taking the action demanded or re-
scinding the action challenged. Second, the defendant may as-
sume the cause of action as a plaintiff in its own right. Finally,
in cooperation with the plaintiffs' attorneys, the defendant may
agree to a settlement of the action. In any case, the plaintiffs'
attorneys are prevented from pursuing the issues to final judg-
ment. This raises the question of whether they are neverthe-
less entitled to reimbursement for their efforts to that point.
When this question is analyzed with reference to the "but for"
standard, the dispositive issue becomes whether the defendant's
salutary action would have occurred "but for" the pressure ex-
erted by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
It may become unnecessary for the plaintiffs to pursue a
cause of action to final judgment because the defendant takes
unilateral action to correct the condition complained of. Al-
though it may be appropriate to dismiss such a case as moot,122
a cause of action for reimbursement of attorneys' fees may sur-
vive. This result was illustrated by the 1968 case of Globus,
Inc. v. Jaroif,' 23 a shareholders' derivative action to set aside
a stock option plan allegedly ratified in violation of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934124 and the regu-
120. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
121. Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957).
122. See generally United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
632-33 (1953).
123. 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
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lations thereunder.125 The plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment was denied without prejudice to its renewal after certain
additional facts had been obtained. 120 After discovery the
plaintiff, "[a]rmed with these additional facts," was preparing
to renew its motion for summary judgment when the defendant
corporation's board of directors and the officer concerned can-
celled the stock option agreement. 27 The court thereupon dis-
missed the action as moot, but concluded that "defendants' can-
cellation after plaintiff had prosecuted its action to the brink
of success provides a sufficient basis for an inference that the
cancellation was in fact due to plaintiff's efforts."1 28  Accord-
ingly, reimbursement for attorneys' fees was authorized, al-
though the success was achieved short of a final judgment.1 29
A second method by which a defendant can undermine the
benefit produced by the plaintiffs' attorneys is simply to assume
the prosecution of the plaintiffs' cause of action. An action
which is derivative as well as representative seeks to enforce
a right which properly should have been asserted by the corpo-
ration or association itself.130 Therefore it is possible for the
attorneys of would-be plaintiffs to prepare or prosecute a deriv-
ative action, only to have it supplanted by a primary action
brought by the corporation or association. Although ordinarily
the plaintiffs' attorneys are not entitled to fees for benefits re-
sulting from the action of the corporation's own counsel,1 31 ex-
ceptions have been recognized where that action is induced by
the threat of litigation.
An example of such an exception is Gilson v. Chock Full
O'Nuts Corp.,132 in which a shareholder's attorney prepared
125. SEC Reg. 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) (employment of
manipulative and deceptive devices).
126. Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
127. Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
128. Id. at 810.
129. Id. See also Parham v. Southwestern Bell TeL Co., 433 F.2d
421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970) (injunctive relief in a civil rights action denied
in view of the defendant's "tremendous" voluntary progress, but attor-
neys' fees awarded in recognition of the suit's effect as a "catalyst");
Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1968), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 140-42 infra.
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534
(1970); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-48
(1949); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341 (1856). See also
Hornstein, supra note 92, at 785.
131. Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 254 F. Supp. 617, 620 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
132. 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964) (en banc). See also Comment, 64
COLUaL L. REv. 1343 (1964).
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a complaint seeking to recover for the corporation profits
allegedly made by certain officers and directors on "short-swing"
transactions proscribed by section 16 (b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.1 33 The day before he intended to file his
complaint, he was advised that the corporation had sued the of-
ficers and directors in its own right.134 Considering his subse-
quent claim for fees, the court acknowledged that attorneys' fees
should not be awarded merely for bringing a claim to the at-
tention of the corporation'3" nor for furnishing "watch-dog"
services after the corporation's action had commenced. 130 Never-
theless, the court held that the attorney's services in preparing
the complaint were sufficient to merit reimbursement.
In reaching this result, the court stressed both the expressed
attitude of the corporation and the timing of its eventual suit.
The shareholder's attorney had advised the corporation of the
details of the alleged illegal transactions, but was informed that
the corporation's "preliminary investigation indicates that there
has not been any violation by the individuals named . . .,37
The attorney had also warned the corporation of the two-year
statute of limitations, but he was advised of the corporation's
suit only two days before much of the cause of action would
have been barred. 38 The court held that under these circum-
stances it was "surely not unreasonabl [e]" to draft a complaint,
and on that basis reimbursement was authorized.3 0
Four years later, the same court of appeals extended the
Gilson exception to an almost identical case, in which the share-
holder's intention to file a complaint had been frustrated not
by the corporation's lawsuit but by the offending officer's pay-
ment to the corporation of the "short-swing" profits due it.1"10
In terms suggesting the "but for" test, the court concluded that
"the corporation would most probably have done nothing at all
about [its officer's] trading activities had [the shareholder's at-
torney] not investigated on [the shareholder's] behalf.' 4' Re-
imbursement for the attorney's fee was therefore allowed. 42
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
134. 331 F.2d at 110.
135. rd. at 109.




140. Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 470-71 (2d Cir.
1968).
141. Id. at 472.
142. Cf. Powell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir.
[Vol. 58:933
ATTORNEYS' FEES
A third development by which the objectives of litigation
may be satisfied short of final judgment is a settlement nego-
tiated by the parties.1 43 In such cases attorneys' fees have gen-
erally been awarded, notwithstanding the participation of the
defendant's counsel in the creation of the benefit. For example,
the Plumbing Fixture Antitrust Cases 144 resulted in a settle-
ment, not a judgment, but compensation for fees was neverthe-
less authorized.14 5 The most recent plumbing fixture litigation
reveals the basis for distinguishing a settlement from unilateral
action by the defendants: not only did the petitioning attorneys
actively contribute to every stage of the settlement negotiations,
but these negotiations were conducted under the full supervision
of the court.1 46  Thus the approval of the settlement actually
recognized the causal relationship between the petitioning at-
torneys' actions and the benefit to the represented classes. 147
4. Other Intervening Causes
When less typical events interrupt litigation and obscure the
causal relationship between the efforts of the plaintiffs' attor-
neys and the ultimate benefit, the "but for" test is still appli-
cable.148 An example of such an atypical development is fur-
nished by Lafferty v. Humphrey.149 The appellant attorneys
had succeeded in establishing a duty on the part of the United
States Government to distribute certain funds to several Oregon
counties. 50 Before the allocation of liability between the De-
partments of Interior and Agriculture and the allocation of the
1959) (fees awarded for a suit which "breathed new life into a dormant
and inert award" of back wages).
143. See Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71
CoLum. L. REV. 971 (1971).
144. See note 102 supra.
145. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
146. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077, 1080, 1087-89 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). Indeed, a class or derivative action cannot
be settled without the approval of the court. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e),
23.1.
147. Cf. Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968);
Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1967); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff,
279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Dole, supra note 143, at
997-1000.
148. See Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class
Actions-Hornstein Revisited, 6 U. RicmvoND L. REv. 259, 264-67 (1972).
149. 248 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957).
150. Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955).
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benefit among the counties could be litigated, Congress had dic-
tated a solution,' 5 ' the respective departments had complied, 1 2
and the Supreme Court had ordered the case dismissed as
moot. 15 3 Reversing the district court's subsequent denial of at-
torneys' fees, the court of appeals concluded that, despite this
considerable intervention, it would have been "little more than
a play on words" to say that the appellants' efforts had not
been the cause of the benefit to the Oregon counties.' 54
Thus in a number of contexts a "but for" test has been in-
voked to deny reimbursement for attorneys' fees sought for ef-
forts not considered crucial to the creation of a benefit. 155  On
other occasions an award of fees has survived the test when
the attorneys' efforts were reasonably motivated by the exigen-
cies of the case and were at least catalytic of the beneficial re-
sult.156
B. CHARGING THE PROPER PARTY: THE "MATCHING" TEST
While the issue of crediting the proper attorneys for the
creation of a benefit has been litigated in a number of factual
settings, the issue of charging the proper party has generally
been relegated to a secondary status. In La Raza Unida
v. Volpe, 57 for example, while the court recognized the "objec-
tive of . . . matching . . . the costs and the benefits of litiga-
tion,"158 it gave no indication that failure to satisfy a "match-
ing" test would be dispositive. Indeed, the court itself treated
"matching" as merely "[an]other objective," the satisfaction of
which made "more appealing" a holding already founded on "a
sufficient basis."'159 Thus, even in the absence of any "match-
ing" ingredient, 60 the court was evidently prepared to award
151. 43 U.S.C. § 1181g (1970); cf. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1181a-1181f (1970).
152. See Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d 82, 84 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957).
153. McKay v. Clackamas County, 349 U.S. 909 (1955) (per curiam).
154. Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d 82, 84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 869 (1957).
155. E.g., Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973); Derdiarian
v. Futterman Corp., 254 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Edison Light &
Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 34 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.
Pa. 1940), aff'd per curiam 119 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1941).
156. E.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970); Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968);
Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
157. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
158. Id. at 101.
159. Id.
160. But see text accompanying notes 214-16 infra.
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attorneys' fees upon that "sufficient basis." Such a result was
not reached, however, because the representative character of
the governmental defendants fortuitously produced the "more
appealing" "matching" result.161 The "matching" issue can be
similarly avoided wherever the defendant's representative char-
acter enables it to pass the burden of reimbursement to the
actual beneficiaries of the litigation.1 2 Moreover, the issue can
be avoided even when it is the plaintiff which has the ability
to pass expenses to the beneficiaries-such as a government
agency suing on behalf of its co nstitutents, either as parens pa-
triae or as a representative of a class.10 3 In such a case the
plaintiff itself could allocate the cost of the litigation among the
benefited citizens by taxation,16' and no other provision for fees
would be necessary.16 5
It may be expected that the continued expansion of public
interest litigation'6 6 will combine with liberalized rules of stand-
ing 67 to produce a representative suit which involves no partici-
pating party with the ability to pass the costs of the litigation
to the true beneficiaries. 68 The "matching" issue then could
not be avoided, and such an alignment of parties could necessi-
tate either the denial of fees despite the creation of a benefit
or the award of fees despite the absence of "matching."
IV. A NEW APPROACH
A. POLICY OBJECTIVES
In the judicial development of criteria for the reimburse-
ment of attorneys' fees, certain policy objectives have been con-
sistently recognized, and these objectives should continue to be
controlling in any new approach. First, there are the ultimate
objectives of public policy articulated in acts of Congress, includ-
161. See text accompanying notes 92-97 supra.
162. See text accompanying notes 88-94 supra.
163. See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251
(1972).
164. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
cf. Fox v. Lantrip, 169 Ky. 759, 185 S.W. 136 (1916).
165. For example, section 204(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970), authorizes the reimbursement of the
plaintiff's attorneys' lees, except when the plaintiff is the United States.
166. See Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 301-03.
167. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cam L. Rv.
450, 471-73 (1970); cf. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
168. Cf. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Slayton, 407 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 937 (1969).
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ing those acts under which representative actions have fre-
quently been brought, such as the securities'0 9 and antitrust1 0
statutes. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company,17' for exam-
ple, the Court relied upon "the stress placed by Congress on
the importance of fair and informed corporate suffrage.' 72  Sec-
ond, there are the objectives of vindicating important principles
of the common law. These principles are often related to acts
of Congress, as illustrated in the Mills Court's discussion of "the
common-law fraud test of whether the injured party relied on
the misrepresentation.' ' 78 Third, there is the objective of en-
couraging private enforcement of congressional and common-law
policies. For example, the Supreme Court has observed that
"[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to [Securities and Exchange] Commission action,' 7'
and that "private antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons
for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.' 170 Finally, the
reliance on private enforcement suggests the subordinate objec-
tive of affording judicial economy through the encouragement
of consolidation 176 and private settlement. 77
While pursuing the positive objectives of representative liti-
gation, any new approach must also avoid certain difficulties.
First, there is the hazard of promoting conflict within the plain-
tiff class itself. A liberal allowance of attorneys' fees might fos-
ter "an unseemly race to the courthouse among lawyers who
represent different members of the class and wish to acquire
169. E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Swan-
son v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973).
170. E.g., the Plumbing Fixture Antitrust Cases. See note 102 supra.
See also cases cited notes 73-75 supra.
171. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
172. Id. at 396. See also Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 304 ("issues
. . . currently regarded as being of extreme importance. . . [and which]
have been the recent subject of considerable legislative and public con-
cern"); Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environ-
mental Litigation, 58 CORN SL L. Ray. 1222, 1241 (1973) ("[a]ny area of
great public concern").
173. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 380 (1970).
174. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
175. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965); accord, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100-
01 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y.
1968).
176. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973).
177. See generally Dole, supra note 143.
[Vol. 58:933
ATTORNEYS' FEES
representative and lead counsel status."'178 The potential magni-
tude of this problem was illustrated in the Plumbing Fixture
Antitrust Cases;179 in the first round of litigation on the subject
of fees, the attorneys for the designated "Class Representatives"
were awarded over one million dollars from the settlement
fund,18 0 while eleven other groups of plaintiffs' attorneys were
limited to recovery under their private fee arrangements with
their clients.1 8 ' Second, there is the persistent problem of
"strike suits." 8 2  As early as 1882, in Trustees v. Greenough,
the Court was careful to avoid "too great a temptation to parties
to intermeddle in the management of valuable property or funds
.. . " 183 More recently one court has described the temptation
under modern securities legislation as "an open invitation" to
strike suits. 8 4  The court observed pessimistically that "appar-
ently [Congress] regards public policy against proved and re-
peated violations of fiduciary responsibility by corporate officers
at the expense of the public more detrimental to public good
than the violation of generally accepted ethics by attorneys."18 5
Finally, there is the problem that representative litigation is fre-
quently unmanageable. 88 For example, Chief Judge Lumbard
178. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE MN PRocEDuRE§ 1803, at 292 (1972).
179. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
180. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077, 1090 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d 161
(3d Cir. 1973).
181. Id. at 1092-96. But see note 111 supra.
182. A "strike suit" has been defined as a shareholders' derivative
action initiated "with the hope of winning large attorney's fees or pri-
vate settlements, and with no intention of benefiting the corporation
on behalf of which suit is theoretically brought" Note, Security for
Expenses Litigation-Summary, Analysis, and Critique, 52 COLUM I.
REv. 267 (1952). Reviewing the history of shareholders' derivative suits,
the Supreme Court has observed that
[s]uits sometimes were brought not to redress real wrongs, but
to realize upon their nuisance value. They were bought off by
secret settlements in which any wrongs to the general body of
share owners were compounded by the suing stockholder, who
was mollified by payments from corporate assets. These litiga-
tions were aptly characterized in professional slang as "strike
suits."
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
183. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 538 (1882). See note 17
supra.
184. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (SD.N.Y.
1956).
185. Id. See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956). See also Blau v. Rayette-Faberge,
Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968); Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 756 (1970); C.
WhiGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 178.
186. See Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class
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described the celebrated case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin's7
as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a class action.' 88 Al-
though in the early round of that litigation the majority pro-
visionally permitted the action to be maintained, they recognized
that the encouragement of such litigation by the award of at-
torneys' fees contributed to the problem of unmanageability. The
court acknowledged that unreasonably complicated suits "are
not likely to benefit anyone but the lawyers who bring them."'' 19
These three hazards of representative litigation have been best
summarized in the warning that "[t] he class action device must
be protected against the taint that it is ... promoted by attor-
neys who simply are seeking fat fees. .".00
B. A "REASONABLENESS" STANDARD
To answer the question of who should be reimbursed for
attorneys' fees, courts have developed a "but for" test to deter-
mine, either explicitly or implicitly, whether the petitioning at-
torneys have earned reimbursemeunt.15 ' Because the strict appli-
cation of this test has left worthwhile legal services uncompen-
sated,192 the test should be replaced with a more flexible stand-
ard of "reasonableness," and attorneys' fees should be awarded
for "reasonable" legal services.
"Reasonableness" is a finding of fact that nonparticipating
beneficiaries from whom reimbursement is sought'9 8 would have
been "reasonable" to employ such legal services, had the choice
been a product of their consensus. The court's application of
this standard will resemble an inquiry into the motives for
Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972); Simon,
Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 7 LINCOLN L. REv.
20 (1971); Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REV. 426 (1973); Note, Federal Rule 23 Class Ac-
tions: The Manageability Problem, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 112 (1972).
187. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
188. Id. at 572 (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 567 (opinion of the court). Chief Judge Lumbard's
view eventually prevailed in the court of appeals, and the suit has been
dismissed as unmanageable. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d
1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
190. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 178. See also Simon, supra
note 186, at 35 ("[tlhe spectacle of lawyers reaping enormous profits
from lawsuits which do not benefit their clients").
191. See Part III supra.
192. See, e.g., Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 196-206 infra.
193. The "reasonableness" standard would not apply where there




which an individual resorts to legal action and an appraisal of
the "reasonableness" of those motives. The question becomes
simply whether, in view of the expense involved, such action
is initiated with a "reasonable" expectation of improving or pre-
serving the individual's wealth, status, privileges or repose. 0 4
The same question may be asked of a class allegedly benefited
by the efforts of the petitioning attorneys. Viewing the class
as a single person, the court may compare the total benefit with
the total expense and the risk of failure, and ask whether the
employment of the legal services would have been a "reason-
able" decision for the "person" to have made.105 If so, then re-
imbursement should be awarded from the class.
Both the need for a more flexible approach and the appli-
cation of the "reasonableness" standard may be illustrated by
reference to a recent case, generated when a registered closed-
end investment company applied to the Securities and Exchange
Commission for permission to absorb its 91 percent-owned sub-
sidiary under section 17 of the Investment Company Act of
1940.196 The owners of about two percent of the stock in the sub-
sidiary corporation, who had been offered $275 per share for
their interests, retained attorneys when they were notified of
the pending SEC hearings. During the proceedings, allegedly
because of the efforts of these attorneys, the parent corporation
successively raised its offer to $375, $575 and $650 per share and
eventually withdrew the merger proposal, more than two years
after it had been submitted. The minority shareholders sued
both corporations, the sole shareholder of the parent corporation
and three other minority shareholders of the subsidiary corpora-
tion, demanding in short "[t]hat the appropriate combination of
defendants ... make appropriate payments ... to [the plain-
tiffs' attorneys] ."197
The court upheld the dismissal of the suit for attorneys'
fees1 8 on the ground that the Securities and Exchange Com-
194. Cf. Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362,
366-67, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426-27 (1960), quoted in text accompanying note
56 supra.
195. Cf. Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107, 110 (2d
Cir. 1964) (en bane), quoted in text accompanying note 139 supra.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1970).
197. Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262, 1265 (2d Cir. 1973).
198. Without issuing a formal opinion, the district judge had stated
that "no one is interested in my views on this subject but is interested
in getting to the Court of Appeals.... I don't see anything further
to be gained by discussion here or by my writing an opinion. The less
I say the quicker you can get before the Court of Appeals." Id. n.3.
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mission would have disapproved such an unfair merger on its
own initiative, even without the assistance of the plaintiffs' at-
torneys. 19 9 While this appears to be a correct application of the
"but for" test, the case requires a more flexible standard. 20 0 Al-
though a mere claim "for a fair and reasonable attorney's fee
of ten million dollars"' ° is by no means conclusive of the value
of the legal services, it does appear that the plaintiffs' attorneys
had expended considerable effort during the protracted SEC
proceedings. It also appears that the subsidiary corporation in
general, and its minority shareholders in particular, had bene-
fited from the modifications and ultimate abandonment of the
merger proposal.2 0  Applying a standard of "reasonableness,"
the court could have held that the employment of legal serv-
ices had been "reasonable," in view of the benefit which those
services were expected to provide.2 0 3 Indeed, the participating
199. The court employed a "but for" test:
We cannot accept ... the premise that but for [the plain-
tiffs' attorneys'] intervention the SEC would have approved as
"fair and reasonable" the initial offer of [the parent corpora-
tion]. If [the attorneys] had never appeared how can we
properly assume that the SEC would have been so totally
supine or so derelict as to give its approval to a price which
plaintiffs urge was not merely unconscionably low but was in
fact the product of a deception and fraud practiced by [the
defendants] ?...
Assuming that [the plaintiffs' attorneys] did pull the "la-
boring" in the proceeding before the SEC, it was in the interest
of a substantial minority stockholder and it was the basis for
a not insignificant fee. The fact that the SEC permitted ad-
mittedly able and persistent counsel to man the oars does not
at all establish that the vessel would have otherwise foundered.
Id. at 1268-69. Cf. Edison Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utl.
Comm'n, 34 F. Supp. 939, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 119
F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1941), quoted in text accompanying note 115 supra.
200. There was precedent in the same court of appeals to suggest
a "reasonableness" standard. See Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp.,
331 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1964) (en banc), quoted in text accompany-
ing note 139 supra.
201. Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262, 1265 (2d Cir. 1973).
202. Since the proceedings had only maintained the status quo, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs had "realistically conferred no benefit
at all" upon the subsidiary corporation. Id. at 1270. But as early as
1960 the "substantial benefit" principle of reimbursement was held to
be invoked by "a result which corrects or prevents an abuse." Bosch
v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 366, 101 N.W.2d
423, 427 (1960) (emphasis added), quoted in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970) and in text accompanying note 56 supra.
See text accompanying note 194 supra.
203. The rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission permit
"a person" to be represented by counsel "in any proceeding." 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(b) (1973). Cf. Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (b) (1970).
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intervenors had evidently considered the employment of legal
services a "reasonable" measure to defend their interests, for as
of the date of the action they had paid the "not insignificant
fee' 2 04 of some $150,000.205 This commitment of funds by the
owners of two percent of the stock in the subsidiary corporation
is compelling evidence that all the minority shareholders were
threatened by the merger proposal, and that it would have been
"reasonable" for the shareholders to have employed counsel by
consensus. 20 6 Accordingly, the subsidiary corporation, as the
represenative of its shareholders, should have been required to
compensate the plaintiffs' attorneys for opposing the merger.
Thus under the proposed "reasonableness" standard reimburse-
ment should generally be awarded for "reasonable" legal serv-
ices, notwithstanding failure to satisfy a strict "but for" test
The award of attorneys' fees is an exercise of a court's equi-
table power,2 0 7 and the trial court will therefore ordinarily be
reversed only for an abuse of discretion.2 0 8  Consequently, aban-
donment of the "but for" test in favor of a more flexible "rea-
sonableness" standard might be expected to discourage uniform-
ity or foster wholesale fee-shifting, as under the English rule
which has been rejected in America.20 9 There are, however, cer-
tain limitations on reimbursement which would survive such a
substitution of tests. First, reimbursement of fees should be
awarded only for services which pursue objectives of major im,
portance-normally those expressed in or related to a federal
statute.210 Where a statute precludes reimbursement or imposes
204. Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262, 1269 (2d Cir. 1973). See note
199 supra.
205. Id. at 1265.
206. It would not have been realistic to expect the shareholders of
the subsidiary corporation to resist the merger by consensus, since 91
percent of the stock was owned by the principal defendant, whose tech-
nical loss as a shareholder would have been more than compensated
by its gain as the surviving corporation. See id. at 1264-65. Indeed,
this prospect of gain was so substantial that it generated the allegations
that the defendants had been guilty of "deception and fraud." Id. at
1268; see note 199 supra. In such a case, the "reasonableness" standard
must be applied to the threat of injury to the interests of the share-
holders in general, without regard for the adverse interest of the wrong-
doer among them.
207. See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233,
234-46 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1929).
208. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1973). But see Perkins v. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., 474 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940
(1973).
209. See Part I supra.
210. See text accompanying notes 169-75 supra.
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conditions thereon, the statute must control.2 1 ' Second, reim-
bursement should be ordered only for legal services which prove
successful, notwithstanding the "reasonableness" of the at-
tempt.212  Third, courts should continue to view "strike suits"
with disfavor, and a showing of an attorney's misconduct should
continue to be relevant to the award of fees.2 18 Finally, the
"reasonableness" standard should apply only when a class of
nonparticipants is benefited. 21 4 Since the rationale of the "rea-
sonableness" standard is that the class would "reasonably" have
employed certain services itself, the standard is applicable only
where the class would bear the burden of a reimbursement
award. In other words, the test of "matching. . . the costs and
the benefits of litigation," suggested incidentally in La Raza
Unida v. Volpe,2 15 should be applied carefully as a natural limit
on reimbursement in every case.
21 6
211. See, e.g., note 91 and accompanying text supra. Cf. La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972), quoted in text accom-
panying note 77 supra.
212. See Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn.
362, 366-67, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426-27 (1960), quoted in text accompanying
note 56 supra.
213. See Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir.
1968); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide safeguards against "strike suits." A shareholders' derivative action
may not be maintained unless the complaint "allege[s] with particular-
ity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he
desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary,
from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to
obtain the action or for not making the effort." FtD. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
Cf. section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p
(b) (1970) (shareholders' derivative action to recover "shortswing"
profits barred unless "the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
same thereafter"). Neither a class action nor a derivative action may
be dismissed or compromisd without appropriate notice and the ap-
proval of the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), 23.1.
214. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714 (1967), discussed in text accompanying notes 78-87 supra. See
also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394 (1970) ("an award
that will operate to spread the cost proportionately among [the share-
holders of the plaintiffs' corporation]"); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939) ("doing justice as between a party and the
beneficiaries of his litigation"); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527,
532 (1882) ("the most equitable way of securing [proportionate] contri-
bution" from bondholders situated similarly to the petitioner).
215. 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 95-97, 157-60.
216. The representative defendant in La Raza Unida satisfied the
"matching" test. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra. The test




Attorneys' fees present problems which are extremely prac-
tical and not easily subjected to theoretical analysis.21 7 Any
general principle or standard for reimbursement must be applied
with discretion and flexibility. If the policies underlying the
"reasonableness" standard are always recognized as paramount
to the mechanics of its application, the standard may indeed af-
ford the necessary flexibility. In this way, courts can ensure
that attorneys are compensated for properly pursuing legal
rights or defenses, but not rewarded for unethical or frivolous
practices.
group against a private industrial corporation. Thus reimbursement of
attorneys' fees in such a case would not be appropriate. But see Wilder-
ness Soc'y v. Morton, No. 72-1796 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 4, 1974) (en bane),
in which the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company was held in a 4-3 deci-
sion to be liable for certain attorneys' fees incurred in an effort to pre-
vent construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline. Recognizing the limita-
tions of the substantial benefit test, the majority of the court admitted
that "we would have to stretch it totally outside its basic rationale to
apply it here." Nevertheless, freely citing substantial benefit precedents,
the majority justified the award of attorneys' fees on the basis of broad
"interests of justice." Thus the court has seemingly elected to treat
environmental cases much like racial discrimination cases. See note 70
supra. See also Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 332-37; Note, Awarding At-
torney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 COR-
NELL L. FEv. 1222, 1237-46 (1973).
217. See, e.g., Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp.
55. 61-62 (D. Mass. 1963) (Wyzansld, J.).
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